Higher education and economic innovation, a comparison of European countries by unknown
Hoareau et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:24
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/24ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open AccessHigher education and economic innovation,
a comparison of European countries
Cecile Hoareau1*, Jo Ritzen1 and Gabriele Marconi2* Correspondence: c.hoareau@
maastrichtuniversity.nl
1UNU-MERITMaastricht University
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC
Maastricht, Netherlands
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article©
A
mAbstract
This paper compares higher education policies across thirty two European countries,
using the contribution to economic innovation as a benchmark for the comparison. We
suggest that an increase in university autonomy and public funding, that we qualify as
‘empowerment’, positively affects the research and education performance of universities,
and more importantly the innovation potential of countries. We subsequently formulate
policy related recommendations for Europe.Introduction
56 Euros of GDP was generated per hour worked in Norway in 2010 but only 14 Euros per
hour in Bulgaria according to the statistics of the European Commission (2011a, b). What
can explain these differences across Europe? Why and to which extent have some European
countries become more innovative than others? And what is the role of higher education,
and particularly the higher education policies, in a continent where higher education is
mainly publicly funded, in the generation of innovation?
The European Union aims at becoming an Innovation Union with its Europe2020
strategy, even though the EU stagnates on one of the innovation metrics vis-à-vis the rest
of the world: China quadrupled the number of patent applications submitted to the
International Patents Office to 415,829 between 2005 and 2011, while this number
remained more or less the same in the EU over this period with around 100,000
applications (World Bank 2013).
The term innovation has several meanings. We define an innovative economy as one
driven by the implementation of new or significantly improved products, processes, new
marketing or organizational methods in business practices, workplace organization or
external relations (adapted from European Commission and OECD 2005: 16). We proxy in
this paper “innovation” by on the one hand “productivity per hour worked” as an outcome
and on the other employment in knowledge intensive activities as an input. Measures such
as patents and intellectual property rights are often used to proxy innovation. However,
patents are a short-term output . Productivity is the outcome that patents seek to achieve.
Organizational innovations can also increase a firm’s performance by reducing administra-
tive and transaction costs, and hence increase productivity (European Commission and
OECD 2005: 51). We concentrate particularly on labor productivity (value added per hour
worked), given that labor productivity is more likely to be influenced by education than
capital productivity.Hoareau et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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considering the influence of technology and physical capital. Technological progress itself
does not come from heaven, but is the result of new vintages of human or physical capital
with higher productivity levels (Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Grossman and Helpman 1991;
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 and Aghion and Howitt 1998). At the same time, the changes
in the productivity levels of new vintages of physical capital could be the result of the
involvement of knowledge workers in the production process. This is the reason why we
also use employment in knowledge intensive activities as a proxy for the innovation in a
country because we assume that innovative economies have a broader knowledge intensive
industry than other economies.
The ultimate objective of economic innovation is to achieve economic growth. Yet, we
have chosen to steer away from economic growth data given the erratic trends in growth
over the peculiar period of investigation (2008–2012)1.
We concentrate on higher education because that is the level of education which provides
the advanced skills necessary for a high innovation environment. Higher education serves a
variety of purposes, but the contribution of higher education through the productivity of
workers is an important one. More specifically, we concentrate on higher education policies
and their impact on the performance of higher education across European states, so as to
better understand how higher education public policy is related to economic growth.
We surmise that “empowerment”, a notion which points to the appropriate regulatory
environment characterized by university autonomy and the appropriate material conditions,
is related to productivity increase of the labor force, through the skills of a mobile pool of
graduates and research performance.
We compare higher education policies across a broad set of 32 European states, using
proxy indicators for policy, for the performance of universities and for innovation, all
registered on the country level, in a simplified model in which performance is related to
policy (with a time-lag) and innovation/productivity follows performance. “European” is
here used to extend beyond the EU. Also Turkey is part of our sample of 32 states. With
our approach we also address a methodological flaws related of the ranking for higher
education, which attribute subjective weights to various indicators in order to derive a total
score. This paper proposes a way to provide non-arbitrary weights based on a statistical
analysis with a crude model in order to derive a total score. The paper complements an
earlier publication (Hoareau et al. 2013). It provides a more in-depth overview of key
indicators and of the relationship between these education and economic indicators.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief overview of the relevant
literature on human capital accumulation, economic innovation and education. Section 2
explains the indicators we have used for innovation, higher education policy (autonomy and
funding) and the performance of higher education institutions. Section 3 presents a
descriptive overview of these indicators and their relationships using simple regression
analyses. Section 4 presents the non-arbitrary comparative method which relies on factor
analysis. Section 5 presents some recommendations.1. Literature review
The accumulation of knowledge through education can increase labor productivity,
innovation and growth. This occurs through the change in the quality of new vintages of
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leading to “labor saving” of low skilled workers, as a result of the automation of routine jobs.
In the past four decades the supply of skilled workers increased rapidly, but demand
outpaced the supply, leading to an increase in the wage premiums for well trained workers.
This is the race between technology and education, a term coined by Jan Tinbergen. The
race has been lost by education, because it was not only racing to keep up, but at the same
time contributed to technology (Acemoglu 2002).
The relationship between skills-acquisition – education – and technological change is
likely to be non-linear. Van Zon and Antonietti (2004) showed that an increase in the level
of formal education can lead to a reduction in the rate of growth. They explain this
phenomenon as the creative destruction process: increasing innovation increases the need
for re-training spells, which leads to ‘technology adoption costs’ due to output foregone
during the re-training periods. Ritzen (1976) also explained this phenomenon through the
investment costs needed for formal education, which reduce the room for private
consumption.
Human capital does not affect innovation uniformly. Vandenbussche et al. (2006) argued
that a more educated workforce does not only facilitate the creation of new technologies,
but also increases the country’s capacity to adopt technologies already developed elsewhere.
This facilitates cross country convergence and the process of ‘catching up” (Barro 1991,
Barro and Lee 1993, Baumol 1986; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005; Kneller and Stevens 2006).
Goldin and Katz (2008) find that advances in education attainments (measured by degrees
achieved) account for 15% of the 2.23% per year gain in real GDP per capita from 1915 to
2005. This effect could be higher if the potential impact of (higher) education and public
research on the speed of “unskilled labor saving” or “human capital enhancing”
technological progress had been taken into account. They furthermore note that technical
change is not only skill-based.: innovations in the early twentieth century were also passed
on to less skill-intensive sectors, like electricity.
The positive impact of higher education increases as countries come closer to the
technology frontier (Vandenbussche et al. (2006), as shown empirically by Aghion et al.
(2009a,b) for developed countries, and Ang et al. (2011) for developing countries).
Technological change increases the demand for expert thinking and complex communica-
tion (“non-routine work”), acquired through higher education (Levy and Murnane 2005).
The contribution of (higher) education occurs through the provision of quality education
rather than merely a quantitative expansion, as Hanushek and Woessman (2012) have
shown using internationally comparable assessments; and as Asteriou and Agiomirgianakis
(2001) similarly demonstrated for Greece.
Before 2000 research on human capital and economic growth concentrated on the impact
of the number of years of education in the working population on GDP. It turned out that
such a relation could not be established with a substantial significance (Pritchett 2001). A
major turn-about came with Barro (2001) who underlined the role of education for long-
term economic growth using both years of education as well as a measure of educational
quality (the internationally comparable assessments of PISA). Also Kimko and Hanushek
(2000) find that scores on international examinations (as indicators of the quality of school-
ing capital) mattered more than years of attainment for subsequent economic growth.
Public policies play an important role in enhancing the outputs and quality of higher
education. This study concentrates on public financial investment and on autonomy, two
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European-wide the notion of university autonomy has been heavily debated in public policy,
with various reforms aiming at increasing the autonomy of universities from the Central
Government or State Governments, for example by giving universities the ability to manage
themselves financially. Universities in Europe are largely publicly funded (75%) amidst
efforts to diversify funding. Yet funding is also highly controversial in the public policy
debate.
The literature provides evidence on the correlation between these two policy elements
(funding and autonomy) and university performance. Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Aghion
et al. (2007) find that investments in research-related education are likely to pay off for areas
which specialize in innovation and are close to the world technological frontier. Aghion
et al. (2009a, b), along the pathways of Volkwein (1986) and Volkwein and Malik (1997),
investigated the impact of other public policies, like the governance mechanisms of
universities on research output using the number of patents and the position of the
university in international research rankings as university performance indicators. They
found that university autonomy and competition were positively correlated with university
outputs across the US and Europe. They also found a positive relationship between funding
shocks and patent production when public universities are more autonomous and more
competitive.2. Indicators
Our analysis of the impact of innovation policies on economic innovation relies on a set of
eighteen statistical indicators. These indicators are described below2. In some cases the
available data did not cover all countries. We calculated missing values using regression
analysis (for details: see the technical report, Hoareau, Ritzen and Marconi, 2012). In other
words, we used proxies from other sources in order to predict missing values. For example,
regarding public expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita, we have used
similar World Bank indicators for 2008, as well as 2006 when 2008 data was unavailable (as
was the case only for Turkey), to predict the data points which were missing in the OECD
database.2.1. Economic innovation
Economic innovation is measured by labor productivity and the percentage of employees in
Knowledge Intensive Activities (KIAs). More innovative societies are likely to have both a
higher labor productivity as well as a higher percentage of employees in Knowledge
Intensive Activities3. Labor productivity – GDP per capita per hour worked – strongly
relates to employment in Knowledge Intensive Activities. Moreover, North-Western
European countries, like Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, and
Iceland, appear to be the most innovative across Europe in terms of KIAs.2.2. Higher education policies
● Autonomy
The indicators of higher education policies we have used to look at the relationship with
innovation are autonomy and public funding. Autonomy is understood very differently
across European countries because of differences in culture and history. For example, in
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‘academic freedom’, namely that professors of the universities (the Senate) –once they are
appointed- choose their own leadership and decide themselves on the design of the degree
programs and the research subjects and content, within location, staffing and funding
arrangements decided by the Government. In the UK and the Netherlands, in contrast,
autonomy is the ability of institutions to function independently from the Government (in
terms of raising and managing their own funds etc. and in terms of the freedom to choose
the subject and content of education and research), while the concept of academic freedom
is no longer a matter of the interpretation of the Senate, but for the appointed leadership of
the university.
There are also differences between countries in terms of the autonomy to attract students.
In some countries the number of places that the Government will finance in a university is
decided by the Government. In other countries a university can enroll (with Government
funding) all students who apply and are admitted. Studies which are subject to a numerous
fixus imposed by Government are an exception.
To capture different notions of autonomy, we use three concepts, namely organizational,
policy and financial autonomy.
Organizational autonomy measures the extent to which a university is allowed to decide
on its own organizational structures, its own internal authority-, responsibility- and
accountability structures, as well as its institutional leadership. Organizational autonomy
includes the notion of a supervisory board for the university which appoints the top
leadership of the university (the president, board or rector), where the top leadership
appoint the deans and the professors.
Policy autonomy includes the ability of universities to create academic communities
through the selection of staff and students and to determine their teaching and research
programs (it includes “staffing” and “academic autonomy”).
Financial autonomy is related to a university’s ability to attract income from additional
funding sources, to be able to decide on the internal allocation of funds, to build reserves
and to borrow funds on the capital market. University systems in which Governments
allocate funds by line items, where unused funding has to be returned at the end of the year,
or where universities cannot borrow money or develop alternative funding sources are
considered not to be financially autonomous.
A shift in the degree of autonomy does not automatically lead to a reduction in
Government control. For example, the retreat of a priori command and control system in
some continental countries (such as having the Government laying down the national-wide
curricula) towards more posteriori quality control mechanisms (based on an a posteriori
evaluation of programs), may imply a displacement of the relative role of the Government
rather than a retreat.
Autonomy may also be experienced differently at different levels within the university.
Musselin (2004) shows for French institutions that more university autonomy from the
Government may well imply that the university leadership decides on a strategy which limits
the freedom of academics more than in the situation of more Government control. Van
Vught and Neave (1991) give a description of the changing role of the relationship between
universities and the Government as a move away from state control to state supervision.
The Center for Higher Education Policy Studies CHEPS, INCHER and NIFU-STEPS
(2008) have assessed these dimensions of autonomy through a questionnaire sent to and
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coded the extent to which autonomy has been achieved in organizational, policy and
financial autonomy on an ordinal scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) (for organizational
autonomy) and 1 (low) to 3 (high) for policy and financial autonomy. The scores only reflect
a comparative picture at the national level. They ignore possible differences on the regional,
federal or institutional level within a country. They indicators also do not capture
differences that may exist in levels of autonomy across degree courses, for example in the
selectivity of undergraduate versus postgraduate degrees.
● Funding
Our first indicator for funding is the effort that countries make, namely annual expenditure
per student by institution for all services related to higher education relative to GDP per
capita in 20084 (OECD 2011: 221). The services include core services such as teachers;
school buildings, teaching materials and school administration. They also include ancillary
services. Measuring the full-cost of higher education institutions is a challenge in several
European countries, because of the different funding streams related to a university for
research or for education (Estermann and Kanep 2008).
Research expenditures of universities include expenditures financed through private and
public sponsors and separate grants. This is an average measure for the whole country.
Underneath are substantial differences between (types of) higher education institutions, for
example, in France between universities and selective professional schools “grandes écoles”,
or in the UK between the prestigious University of Oxford and institutions which acquired
the status of university more recently.
A second funding indicator is public subsidies to households and private entities as a
percentage of total public expenditure on higher education in 2008 (data from Eurostat).
One might hypothesize that countries which are able to generate the broadest participation
of the pool of talent would also be the most able in increasing human capital- led
-innovation. A way to improve access is to invest in financial aid schemes, such as grants,
scholarships and loans. Extra child allowances and extra tax deductions are also used in
Europe as instruments to support parents with children in university. Student grants and
more recently loan schemes (in some cases the latter have been replacing the former) have
been implemented in all European countries.
We realize the imperfection of our present measure as we do not control for the private
costs in the country. For example, if 100% of the direct costs of education were private, then
public subsidies to higher education would be 100% (there would be no other expenditures).
At the same time our indicator (the relation to tuition costs) would not be a problem if pri-
vate costs were more or less the same in Europe. However, countries like the UK, Portugal
and the Netherlands have (considerable) higher tuition fees than the rest of the countries.
One should bear in mind that other measures, like the availability of state-funded places
might also affect equality of opportunity (besides financial aid), to promote access. For
example, the reduction of the number of state-funded places in Hungary between 2000 and
2012 from roughly 60,000 to 35,000 (plus 15,000 places with 50% funding) could well have
had a (substantial) impact on the composition of the student force by parental background
with the likelihood that inequity will be increasing5.
Subsidies in the form of grants loans and scholarships show a large variation in Europe,
ranking from around 50.9% of public expenditure for tertiary education in Cyprus to merely
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highest tuition fees in Europe. The UK ranks high in terms of the availability of facilities,
but the trend is towards (slightly) less availability of loans and grants. The same holds true
for the Netherlands.
There is considerable political debate (Johnstone and Marcucci 2010) on the impact of
loans on student choice behavior and on the distribution of the risk of non-completion or
inability to pay back between the lender and the Government. Some scholars argue in favor
of grants over loans for students from low income backgrounds with the rationale that debt
aversion is correlated with social background, even though it appears that the introduction
of student loan schemes did not affect negatively the number of applications from students
from a varied backgrounds if one controls for their grade after high school (Babb et al.
2004: 17). However, that does not yet undercut the argument in favor of more aid to
students from poor backgrounds, as they might not have had the same chances to develop
their ability.
● University performance
Public policies in higher education affect economic innovation through the outputs of the
higher education system. Traditionally, studies have concentrated on the outputs of higher
education in terms of research, as well as in terms of educational output measured by
attainment rates. Here we use as indicators for university research, including: a- Scientific
publications within the 10% most cited scientific publications worldwide as a percentage of
total scientific publications of a country the percentage of universities in the ARWU
proportionally to the population; b- the number of incoming Marie Curie and young
European Research council starting grant winners per million inhabitants; c- private-public
co-publications per million inhabitants.
The indicators for the education output are: a- the number of enrolled students as a
percentage of the population of corresponding age; b- those entering higher education
through an alternative route; c- graduation rates (graduates relative to enrollment);
c- graduate employment rates of 18–34 year olds three years after graduation; d- the
percentage of inward mobile students proportionally to the student population in the host
country. All the performance indicators were taken between 2008 and 20117.
This mix of indicators allow us to measure different dimensions of the quality and
quantity of the higher education performance, namely not only educational attainment and
publication outputs, but also the openness of a higher education system (both in terms of
education and research), international students and staff as well as for students from
non-traditional backgrounds, its connections to the private sector (private-public
co-publications), as well as the employability of graduates.2.3. The higher education landscape in size
Figure 1 gives an impressionistic view of the European higher education landscape in terms
of student numbers and the size of the population.
Countries have a different participation rate in higher education because they have a
different demographic composition. Countries with a young population (like Turkey) will
have more students. Other countries like Germany, the UK or France, have had
expansionary policies in higher education, for example with the widening participation
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Figure 1 Students and population.
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in terms of enrolment numbers (regarding the education performance), number of
inhabitants (for research performance) or some general economic measure (GDP per capita
for example).3. A comparative overview
Figure 2 summarizes the data for the thirty two European countries of our sample in the
form of comparative graphs by groups of indicators.
Figure 2 shows some systemic differences. For example, higher education systems, of
Sweden, the UK, Ireland and Finland, appear to be relatively open regarding the inclusion
of students from various backgrounds, i.e. traditional secondary education or alternative
routes such as work experience, vocational training or prior learning8. But others, like Italy
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Figure 2 Comparative overview.
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Eastern Europe
Figure 2 also shows a certain - not unexpected - discrepancy between Northern/some
Western European countries and Southern/Eastern European countries. Public expenditure
to tertiary education as a percentage of GDP per capita was twice higher in Sweden (50.9%)
9 than in Greece (25.1%)10 in 2008. Cyprus is a notable exception, with one of the highest
percentages of public expenditure in tertiary education of Europe in 2008. The Cypriot
Government had invested (comparatively) heavily in higher education over the past two
decades to expand higher education. Cypriot universities are relatively recent. Following the
creation of three public universities in 1989, 2002 and 2003, a further four private
universities have been created. And Cyprus was also part of the group of countries having
achieved the target of 40% of 30–34 year olds with a higher education degree in 2012
(European Commission 2013). However, it is unlikely that Cyprus can maintain these
financial outlays for universities, given the difficult, present situation.
Research attractiveness and -productivity are highest in Northern and Western Europe.
Switzerland and the Netherlands had the highest number of publications in the most cited
scientific journals in 2007. Together with the UK, they were also the most attractive coun-
tries for European researchers under the prestigious Marie Curie scheme and recipients of
the European Research Council starting grants.
This concentration of research attractiveness and productivity around Northern and
Western European countries may have a self-reinforcing effect: highly talented students and
researchers ‘vote with their feet’ by moving toward the most rewarding systems. This effect
may have become accentuated by the economic crisis in the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2008. Governments of countries which are less attractive should consider this as a
challenge, namely by providing as a priority the means to their higher education systems to
be competitive on a European and international scale. The convergence in the quality of
higher education and research relates to further convergence in innovation in Europe and
ultimately to a continuation of the convergence in GDP per capita. The major challenge for
the EU seems to be to bring convergence in the development of higher education and
research within Europe, not by delaying the fast runners, but by spurring those lagging
behind.
Some education metrics also reveal a certain discrepancy between North/West and
Southern Europe, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Germany have some
of the largest rates of graduate employment. 93.5% of graduates were likely to be in
employment three years or less after graduation in 2010 in the Netherlands. This relatively
high employment rate is likely to be influenced by the active role of the social insurance
agencies and municipalities in contracting out work placements to employers for
unemployed youth. Moreover, access to unemployment benefits has become more tied up
to work experience with six months of work required (OECD and European Commission
2008: 6). Conversely, Greece and Italy have some of the lowest graduate employment
figures. As a response, the Greek Government has tied the funding of universities to the
employability of the graduates in the law (4009/11).
But the wealthiest countries in Europe do not always have the best performance across all
metrics of higher education. Graduation rates in Germany and the Netherlands appear to
be lower than the average; the independent learning culture or the fairly generous financial
aid schemes having been mentioned as potential explanations.
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France for example11. The UK appears as a notable outlier in this respect, with a strong
organizational autonomy. British universities are deciding on their own internal authority,
including their own legal entities, their academic structures, or their executive heads and
governing bodies.
And the countries with the highest enrollment figures are not necessarily those with the
highest graduation rates. Slovenia is the most illustrative example. It has the highest
difference between enrollment and graduation rate: 57.5% of the population aged 20 years is
enrolled in a tertiary education degree; but only 17.1% of enrolled students graduated in
Slovenia in 2010. In order to reduce such discrepancy, Slovenian higher education
institutions could for example review the way it admits applicants in order to make sure
that students are oriented toward the course of studies toward there are best suited. They
could also provide more support to student learning in order to improve graduation rates.3.2. A preliminary analysis of the effect of higher education policies
One way to understand whether common policy issues across Europe deserve particular
attention is to look at the statistical association policies on performance and economic
innovation. Table 1 below presents these effects in the form of the beta coefficients of a
series of univariate regression analyses. This approach has a number of limitations. For
example, the same regression technique is used across data of various type (categorical or
interval). Yet, the regression coefficients summarized in Table 1 provide a preliminary
indication of the relationships between indicators.
Table 1 provides various relevant pointers. Knowledge employment and labor-
productivity significantly relate to an increase in research performance. But they are
significantly associated to only part of the set of education-related indicators (i.e. graduate
employment, the inclusion of students from non-traditional backgrounds and the
enrolment of students). Also, they significantly relate only to a minority of policy indicators,
namely the level of financial aid. One additional euro produced per hour is associated to an
increase in 0.4% of the amount of total education expenditure in student financial aid.
Table 1 also shows that there does not appear to be a relationship between policy
indicators (except between expenditure per students and financial aid which are logically
related)12. The countries with the highest levels of expenditure per student are not
necessarily the ones with the largest amount of university autonomy. The reforms to
increase university autonomy since the late 1990s in Europe have indeed been coupled with
a steady reduction of expenditure per students.
In addition, Table 1 provides some insightful preliminary findings related to policy
indicators. It shows expenditure per student is the policy measure which is most often
significantly related to other outcomes. Higher public expenditures seem to contribute to
making a system more attractive, being associated with a higher likelihood for graduates
to find employment and to a better research performance of universities. For example, a
one percent increase in expenditure per student relative to GDP per capita is associated
to an increase in the percentage of international students by 0.48 in comparison to the
total student population. A percentage increase in expenditure per student is also
associated with an increase by 0.65 percentage points in the employment rates of
graduates three years upon graduation and by 29 percentage points in publications in the















Organizational autonomy 1.83 0.025 −0.52 0.97 −0.82 −0.74 0.13 2.66
Financial autonomy 0.46 0.16 −0.1 0.08 −0.82 −1.98 1.19 1.6
Policy autonomy 0.07 0.19 1.31 0.51 −10.73 −0.83 3.60* −0.16
Exp per student −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.81** −0.52 0.48**** 0.59** −0.65*
Financial aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19** −0.36 0.25*** 0.16 −0.23
Financial location 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.08 −0.06 0.03 −0.02
Internat. students −0.23 −0.02 0.00 0.42*** 0.92*** −1.06 0.30 −0.47
Transition 0 0.00 0.02 0.32* 0.37 0.33 0.19 −0.35
Enrollment 0.02 0.00 0.00 −0.17* −0.24 −0.09 −0.14 −0.16
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Marie Curie fellos 0.07 0.06 0.01 1.17*** 1.47* −0.37 1.03** 1.11** −1.05
Public-private co-publications 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.04** 0.06* 0.06 0.01 0.04* −0.10***
ERC wins 0.36 0.22 0.04 2.83** 3.00 4.33 1.92 2.93* −2.35
Knowledge employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.40 −0.03 0.21 0.51*** −0.73***
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−2.20** −0.31 0.13** 0.93 0.38 6.95 0.23 0.7 2.33
0.41 2.58 0.14 0.86 0.84 16.64 0.35 1.95 4.11
1.02 3.07 0.07 −0.67 0.26 9.45 0.09 0.19 −1.65
0.00 0.65*** 0.03*** 0.29** 0.22*** 3.89** 0.06** 0.31 0.52
−0.16* 0.07 0.00* 0.13** 0.06* 1.32* 0.01 0.16 0.40**
−0.01 −0.06 0.00 0.02 −0.03 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.05
−0.03 0.05 0.01 0.22** 0.16** 1.33 0.03 0.32 0.32
−0.02 0.17 0.02** 0.21** 0.11** 2.07 0.03* 0.49** 0.48*
−0.02 −0.18 0 −0.12** −0.05 −2.27*** −0.01 −0.33*** −0.49***
0.48** −0.01 −0.15 0.03 −0.34 −0.01 0.12 −0.21
0.25** 0.01*** 0.1 0.11** 2.76** 0.03** 0.36** 0.41
−3.93 9.90** 8.33**** 5.43**** 98.97**** 2.10**** 9.25** 19.62****
−0.38 0.49 0.07**** 0.53**** 9.67**** 0.19**** 1.22**** 2.29****
0.19 1.30** 0.11**** 1.22**** 13.03**** 0.31**** 1.52*** 2.49***
0 0.07** 0 0.05**** 0.02**** 0.01**** 0.07*** 0.11***
−0.53 3.62** 0.35 3.70**** 2.55**** 40.60**** 4.03*** 7.47***
0.07 0.44** 0.02** 0.31**** 0.16*** 3.70*** 0.05*** 1.23****
−0.05 0.2 0.01**** 0.24**** 0.11*** 2.24*** 0.04*** 0.51****
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.0001.
Note: see Table 2 below for more information regarding the abbreviations.
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publications).
Statistically significant associations are observed among other policy and performance vari-
ables as well. For example financial aid positively contributes to attracting international stu-
dents and researchers (Marie Curie fellows). An additional unit of organizational autonomy
is associated with a 13% higher likelihood to be ranked as a top 500 university (relatively to
the population of the country). One additional unit of policy autonomy relates to a 3.60
percentage point increase in the number of students from non-traditional backgrounds.
The systems with the highest levels of public expenditure are not the ones with the
highest enrolment levels. Increasing public expenditure by one percentage point of GDP
per capita relates to a decrease in enrolment of 0.65 percentage point. This may indicate a
potential under-investment in some ‘crowded’ higher education systems in certain European
countries. Moreover, the most research intensive systems also appear to be the ones with
lower student enrolment. A one percent increase in enrolment corresponds to a decrease in
top publications of 0.12 percentage points. This finding reflects the challenge of matching
broad participation in education to ‘excellence’ in research. Going further, the systems with
the broadest enrolment do not appear to be the most innovative ones with the highest levels
of labor productivity and knowledge employment. A 1% higher enrolment rate relates to a
decrease of 0.33 Euros of GDP per capita produced per hour and 0.49 percentage points
fewer employees in knowledge intensive activities. This finding seems to suggest that quality
trumps quantity. In other words, providing students with a relevant teaching and learning
experience, and supporting them to graduates, may be more important than simply
increasing enrolment numbers. Once confirmed by more methodologically robust analyses,
such a finding would have important implications in an era where public expenditures are
still often calculated based on the number of students in institutions (although
performance-based criteria have gained ground in some European countries).
In methodological terms, running separate regression analyses provided us with a fairly
disaggregated picture. But it did not allow us to obtain a set of general findings related to
the three main groups of indicators being investigated, namely policy, performance and
economic innovation.4. The influence of national policies in higher education on innovation in a model
We use an additional step of analysis in order to understand the transition mechanism
between policy and performance, as well as gain some simplicity among a fairly large set of
indicators.4.1. A two-stage model
This additional step takes the form of a two-stage model, which takes the following simple
form:
Higher education policies do not affect innovation directly. Instead, they lead to
performance outputs, which then may lead to greater economic innovation. We assume
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are linear. We limit the use of this model to a descriptive relationship between education
policy and economic innovation. Three conditions would have to be fulfilled in order to
establish causality: a logical chronology, a correlation between indicators and the absence
of any alternative explanation. The model fulfills two of these conditions; namely a logical
chronology and a correlation between indicators. Regarding the time dimension, the
model introduced a two-year lag between its measure of higher education policy on
the one hand and higher education performance and economic innovation on the other.
The coefficients that we find reflect conditional correlations and cannot be considered to
be causal relationships.
We abstain here from the extensive potential of other drivers of innovation in the
university-innovation nexus. These drivers may be as varied as the existence of linkages to
facilitate diffusion (such as university-innovation relationships), the overall regulatory
framework, the existence of accumulated knowledge, the research and development
landscape, factors specific to a particular market or product such as the level of demand
and cost structure, the type of government, social infrastructures, the existence of property
rights, government consumption, international openness, inflation or the ease of doing
business, etc. (Hall and Jones 1999; Barro 2001; European Commission and OECD 2005:19;
Goldin and Katz 2008; Archibugi et al. 2013: 124).
We also abstain from a vintage approach, well realizing that the impact of new graduates
on productivity is the result of the addition to the stock of graduates.4.2. Non-arbitrary weights
By comparing statistically the impact of different higher education policies on innovation
we can derive non-arbitrary weights. This non-arbitrary method is particularly relevant in
view of existing university rankings, e.g. Universitas21, Academic Ranking of World
Universities (ARWU), Times Higher education Supplement rankings. These rankings assign
weights to selected indicators based on a normative judgment of what the assessors believes
is important. Webster (2001) earlier dismissed the relevance of such normative judgment,
by making a thorough statistical analysis of the US News and World report rankings of
colleges and universities (USNWR ranking). He used a principal component analysis to
reveal some flaws in the US News & World report rankings of colleges and universities,
showing that the most significant ranking criterion should be the average SAT score of
enrolled students and not (as the US News & World report uses) academic reputation.
Webster also found high multicollinearity between the indicators of the USNWR ranking.
Another analysis showing how problematic the arbitrary assigning of weights can be is that
by Saisana et al. (2011), who find that the inferences made by rankings for institutions and
countries are not robust to changes in the weighing system.4.3. Factor analysis
We conduct a factor analysis in a preliminary stage to model building. The factor analysis
allows us to understand the patterns of relationships across indicators. It also allows us to
group indicators to match our main categories. For example, we narrow our analysis to
eight factors, which provides a more simplified approach to our data analysis process than
using eighteen indicators. For example, we group relevant research indicators in a research
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indicators.
This analysis bears additional benefits. It deals with multicollinearity, because the
indicators which are highly multicollinear are grouped into a single factor. We then use
OLS regressions to measure the impact of a given group of factors on another, and use the
coefficients of these regressions as weights to devise a non-arbitrary weighing system.
This analysis is conducted on data standardized using a min-max technique. We use a
particular variant of factor analysis which includes a non-orthogonal (oblique) rotation,
called “direct oblimin” to understand patterns in the data. A rotation makes the output
more understandable, by producing a pattern of loadings where items load more strongly
on one factor and more weakly on others. Non-orthogonal rotation allows the factors to
correlate between each other, and we allowed factors to correlate at 0.3 < γ < 0.8; γ standing
for the correlation coefficient gamma, 0.3 for the policy and performance factors and 0.8 for
the economic factors (Jenrich 1979). Relevant indicators representing university policy,
performance or economic innovation are linearly combined into a number of factors.
We conduct this factor analysis on data for 32 European countries and eighteen
indicators. We normalize the indicators by using a minimax technique because indicators
did not all have the same measurement units13. The factor loadings are presented in
Table 2.
We compute a weight for each of the policy factors, based on its statistical relation with
economic output, using the variation inherent in the data for the 32 countries. These
weights are based on three sets of regression coefficients.
The first OLS regression measures the impact of performance indicators for research
attractiveness and productivity (Xr), international attractiveness Xa), and graduation and
employment, Xg) on economic innovation (Xi):
XiΣ 1; 32ð Þ ¼ αiþ β1Xrþ β2Xaþ βXgþ ei ð1Þ
Σ(1,32) is used to denote the set of thirty two countries.
The other two sets of OLS regressions measure the impact of policy factors on the higher
education performance:
XrΣ 1; 32ð Þ ¼ αrþ β1fundingþ β2policyautonomy þ β3managerialautonomy þ er ð2Þ
XaΣ 1; 32ð Þ ¼ αaþ β1fundingþ β2policyautonomy þ β3managerialautonomy þ ea ð3Þ
XgΣ 1; 32ð Þ ¼ αgþ β1fundingþ β2policyautonomy þ β3managerialautonomy þ eg ð4Þ
‘Funding’ is a factor including public funding per student as a percentage of GDP percapita and financial aid as Figure 2 shows, ‘policy_autonomy’ is the factor corresponding to
policy autonomy and ‘managerial_autonomy’ is the factor corresponding to organizational
and financial autonomy.
4.4. Coefficients regarding the contribution of public funding and autonomy policies in
higher education to economic innovation
These regressions give us the coefficients presented in Table 3 for Eqs. 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Table 3 shows that research/scientific appeal, international attractiveness and graduation/
employability positively influence a country’s economic innovation: increasing scientific
appeal by one standard deviation corresponds to a 0.50 standard deviation increase in
Table 2 Factors and factor loadings
Dimension Sub-dimension Factor Indicator Abbreviation Factor loading
Policy Funding Funding Public expenditure per pupil as a% of GDP per capita 0.78
Financial aid to student as% of total public expenditure on education,
at tertiary level
Fin. Aid. 0.87
Importance of formula and contract in the allocation of public funding Funding allocation x
Autonomy Policy autonomy Policy autonomy Policy autonomy 0.84
Managerial autonomy Organizational autonomy Organizational autonomy 0.83
Financial autonomy Financial autonomy 0.74
Performance Research Research attractiveness
and productivity
Scientific publications within the 10% most cited scientific
publications worldwide as a % of total scientific publications per country
Top pubs. 0.84
Universities in the top 500 ARWU ranking divided by% EU population
of a given country
Top 500 univers. 0.99
Number of incoming yearly Marie Curie fellows per million inhabitants Marie-Curie fellows 0.85
Number of yearly European Research Council starting grant wins per
million inhabitants
ERC wins 0.98
Public-private scientific co-publications per million inhabitants Co pubs 0.75
Education Size Students entering higher education through an alternative route Transition 0.79
Students (ISCED 5–6) aged 20 - as% of corresponding age population Enrolllt = enrollment; x
International openness Inward mobile students as% of student population in the host country Internat. students 0.79
Graduation/graduate employment Graduates in ISCED 5 and 6/enrollment number Grads = graduates; 0.85
Employment rates of 18–34 year olds, 3 years or less after leaving
formal education
Emplt = employment 0.73
Economic innovation Economic innovation Employment in Knowledge intensive industries as% of total employment Knowl. Empl. 0.94




















Impact of performance on economic innovation
Coef. S.E. t P > t 95% confidence interval
Research 0.50 0.14 3.44 0.00 0.20 0.80
Internationalization 0.31 0.14 2.15 0.04 0.01 0.61
Grad/empl 0.10 0.13 0.77 0.75 −0.16 0.37
_cons 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 −0.27 0.27
R2 = 0.50; N = 32
Impact of policy indicators on research performance
Coef. S.E. t P > t 95% confidence interval
Funding 0.52 0.14 3.50 0.00 0.21 0.83
Policy aut. −0.12 0.15 −0.81 0.42 −0.43 0.18
Manag. Aut 0.36 0.15 2.46 0.02 0.06 0.66
_cons 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 −0.29 0.29
R2 = 0.39; N = 32
Impact of policies on internationalization
Coef. S.E. t P > t 95% confidence interval
Funding 0.58 0.15 3.90 0.00 0.27 0.88
Policy aut. 0.00 0.15 −0.03 0.97 −0.31 0.30
Manag. Aut −0.26 0.14 −1.76 0.08 −0.56 0.04
_cons 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 −0.29 0.29
R2 = 0.39; N = 32
Impact of policies on graduation and employment
Coef. S.E. t P > t 95% confidence interval
Funding −0.10 0.18 −0.58 0.56 −0.48 0.26
Policy aut. 0.26 0.18 1.44 0.16 −0.11 0.64
Manag. Aut −0.18 0.18 −1.04 0.30 −0.55 0.18
_cons 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 −0.36 0.36
R2 = 0.08; N = 32
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contributes to a 0.031 standard deviation increase in economic innovation. At the same
time, the quality of the education system (reflected through employment/graduation) does
contribute, although to a lesser extent than research, to the country’s economic innovation.
The table also shows that funding and managerial autonomy relate to an increase in
research performance; while policy autonomy relates to an increase in graduation and
graduate employment. Policy autonomy is not significantly associated with research attract-
iveness and productivity. A plausible interpretation is that policy autonomy increases
student graduation by providing the academic staff the ability to design their own courses
and tailor them to the needs of their students in order to facilitate their learning and the
acquisition of skills relevant to the labor market.
The regression results are the points of departure for the calculation of the weights to
be given to the different policy elements in each of the 32 countries of Europe we have
focused on.
The contribution of each policy element to economic innovation is then calculated by
multiplying the regression coefficients according to the transitive and linear relationship
between policy, performance and economic innovation. More precisely, we use the
coefficients of the performance categories we have identified as positively affecting
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nationalization). We use the significant coefficients regarding the effect of the policy
dimension on these performance criteria to compute the weights because we are inter-
ested in investigating policy dynamics which can be extended beyond a hypothetical
population. These weights are summarized in Table 4 below.
The largest weight is allocated to funding, followed by managerial autonomy (which
is weighted as half the value of funding). Policy autonomy is nearly thirteen times
smaller than funding.
These weights allow us to compare the contribution of each policy to the economic
innovation of their countries. For this, we devise a score, which is computed by multiplying
the size of each of the policy factors with the corresponding weights. A country score is
therefore:





4.5. Results and interpretation
The results are presented in Figure 3. These scores have an intuitive meaning. They are an
approximation to the predicted value of economic innovativeness given our empirical model
and our information on higher education policies. Roughly speaking, they tell us how
innovative a country would be if higher education policies would be the only driver of
economic innovativeness. The presence of negative scores in Figure 3 is due to our
standardization of the policy variables. The lines in the figure represent the division
according to groups of higher education assessment (top, middle and more modest). These
groups are calculated based on differences in scores between countries. And the
demarcation between groups is contingent on the largest difference between adjacent
country values.
Note that our analysis refers to policies from 2008. Since then many changes were
introduced which may have altered this overview. The research team is producing a follow-
up version of this study, due to be published in 2014, in order to track these changes.
Norway, Cyprus, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark appear in the ‘top
group’, where the higher education policies are the most supportive of its innovation
systems. The UK is the only EU country with a comparatively large population in the top
league (our indicators being scaled to population size).
The ‘middle group’ includes Germany, Belgium, Croatia, Austria, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Finland, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Malta, Hungary and Estonia. A third group follows with
Switzerland, France, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland, Turkey, Romania, Latvia, Slovakia, the
Czech Republic, Luxembourg and Greece. The relatively low score for some countries, like
Luxembourg, may be due to the fact that they spend less on universities than their European
counterparts with a similar or lower GDP per capita. The expenditure per student as aTable 4 Weights of policy factors on economic innovation
Weights
Funding (0.52*0.50) 0.26
Policy aut. (0.26*0.10) 0.03
Manag. Aut (0.36*0.50) + (−0.25* 0.31) 0.10
International students and students transitioning
from non-traditional background
Publications in top 10 % scientific journals and
public private publications
GDP per capita
Knowledge employment and labor productivity
Marie Curie fellows, ERC wins and universities













































Figure 3 The quality of university -policy in European countries.
Hoareau et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 19 of 242013, 2:24
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/24percentage of GDP per capita in Luxembourg is proportionally lower than the Czech Repub-
lic for example. This mismatch may come from the novelty and small size of its university
system: the University of Luxembourg was created in 2003. Greece appears at the end of the
scale. The Greek score is due to its financial commitment (Greece having among the lowest
funding for higher education and financial aid according to our 2008 pre-crisis data). It also
relates to government’s policy on autonomy: Greece has low policy and managerial autonomy
scores. Greek universities are unable to manage their assets by borrowing money, or to intro-
duce new programs - a significant factor for educational performance according to our study.
These higher education policy assessments are only partially similar to the innovation
level of countries, simply because our assessment measures the contribution of higher
education policies rather than innovation per se. For example, Switzerland has
comparatively high level of productivity and employment. It also has some of the highest
research and graduate employment performances in Europe (with for example 91.8% of
graduates in employment three years after graduation in 2009). But this assessment is
critical of Switzerland because of a comparatively low percentage of financial aid to
students, which yet has to be solved by an inter-cantonal agreement. This is tantamount to
saying that Switzerland could even do better in innovation, if its higher education policies
were to improve. Conversely, some countries have a low level of innovation despite high
public investments in higher education, as is the case for France and Germany. This
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may not have been transcribed in statistically visible results yet. And Germany has
announced a broad investment in higher education in the form of the excellence initiative.
Infrastructures and institutions also influence higher education. And these results are
only relevant in so far as we have been able to capture how policy variation create a
university environment, institutions which facilitate the transmission of the knowledge
created at universities in the form of human capital and research outcomes, as Aghion
and Howitt (1998) indicate.
Policies which lead to highly performing universities also relate to a country’s GDP per
capita, as presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows that highly performing countries also tend to have a higher than average
GDP per capita, as is the case for Sweden, Denmark, or Norway. Conversely, countries with
a lower GDP per capita have a more modest score, as is the case for Slovakia, or the
Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, less developed countries in Europe find it difficult
to make quantum leaps and appear to choose for a gradual closing of the imitation-
innovation gap (Aghion et al. 2009a, b). This is in deviation to the experience in South
Korea in the seventies where the country pulled itself by the hairs of research policy out of
the swamp of development thresholds.
Some countries, such as Cyprus, Slovenia or Croatia, however, have chosen for a
progressive course (independent from their GDP per capita). Cyprus had a disproportional
large public investment in higher education, Slovenia a comparatively generous financial aid
schemes, and Croatia gave broad autonomy to its universities.5. Recommendations
Given the contribution of higher education to economic innovation, governments should
do more to integrate the promotion of economic innovation into higher education policies.
Eight governments have such an integrated strategy. For example, Denmark now has a
Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education, the UK has established a
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills while Slovenia had a Ministry of Higher
Education, Science and Technology (until March 2012). Five European Governments
actively encourage relevant inter-ministerial cooperation. For example in Norway theFigure 4 Relationship between country scores and GDP per capita.
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closer relations to stimulate innovation.
We also found a general positive contribution of public funding and institutional
autonomy to innovation. At the same time, seventeen European Governments have reduced
their public budgets for higher education, thirteen restricted financial aid programs for
students, and five have restricted autonomy since 2008, all argued on the sovereign debt
crises. And some Governments may feel that they are not able to make much funding leaps
for higher education which are much needed to catch up in innovation. However, countries
can invest in a competitive way in higher education through European funds. The use of
structural and cohesion funds could improve the performance of higher education in less
economically developed regions, as is the case in Poland with a multi-billion Euros
investment.
The implication of the lack of translation of large investments into short-term increase in
performance does not mean that the message is to reduce investment. A continuity of
reforms and investments is necessary for higher education to pay off.
Finally, national Governments know how important autonomy is, but are not so sure
whether universities are always able to use the autonomy with which universities are
entrusted well (i.e. for societal purposes). Policy autonomy translates into relatively high
levels of graduation and employment. Managerial autonomy is important for research
attractiveness and research productivity, but less important for graduation and employ-
ment. Therefore, governments could engage in achieving the autonomy of universities,
provided sufficient quality incentives in funding exist.Conclusions
We address the differences in the levels of economic innovation between European
countries from the perspective of higher education and higher education policies. Most
highly innovative countries in Europe also make a large effort in public investment in higher
education (higher education expenditures to GDP and financial aid to students). These
countries also tend to provide more autonomy to their universities. In other words, we
could show for 32 European countries that the degree of ‘empowerment’ relates to the
performance of higher education and the innovative capacity of countries. This relationship
mostly goes through research outputs. The throughput of higher education (graduation
relative to enrolment) and graduate employment also had a positive relationship. The sheer
size of the higher education student body did not positively relate to economic innovation, a
result which matches a relatively long string of ‘negative’ results regarding the impact of
education if measured only by its size (or years of education) on growth (see for example,
Temple 1999 or Pritchett 2001).
Moreover, the comparison we draw between countries relies on a weighing system for
policies which is theoretically and empirically based (epistemological), and superior to the
a-priori fixed weights based on value judgments common in highly publicized ranking
exercises.
The policy recommendations which spring from these findings are clear for those
countries which want to enhance their innovation potential: focus on funding and on the
institutional structure of higher education which can bring about the best results in terms
of research outputs, research attractiveness and on the employability of graduates.
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an excuse for lower funding and even less so for restrictions on autonomy. Higher
education funding is a choice within a (limited) budget with an effect on the longer run.
One might for this reason even argue that higher education expenditures could be outside
the Maastricht criteria for budget deficits in EU countries. For EU countries in the catch-
up stage there is more over the opportunity of cohesion and structural funds to invest in
higher education and research. For the EU as a whole, the Horizon 2020 program which
would contribute to the higher education efforts in the EU should be enlarged, rather than
curtailed in the budget negotiations for the period 2014–2017.Endnotes
1 Real GDP growth rate dropped by 4 percentage points on average between 2008 and
2009 in the euro area before increasing by 6.4 percentage points between 2009 and 2010
according to Eurostat data. These changes were not characteristic of longer term growth
trends across the Euro area.
2 The data for these indicators is available online at: http://empowereu.org/eeu-dataset/.
3 Knowledge Intensive Activities are activities in which the percentage of tertiary
education persons employed in this activity represents more than 33% (ISCED 5–6).
Knowledge Intensive Activities include for example education and telecommunications,
creative arts and legal and accounting services (Eurostat 2012). The correlation coefficient
between employment in KIAs and labor productivity was r = 0.79.
4 This data includes public and private institutions. But some expenditure data for
students in private institutions is not available for certain countries and some countries
provide incomplete information Where this is the case, only expenditure on public and
government dependent private institutions have been taken into account according to the
OECD (2011: 216). We have also used World Bank data, which includes private and public
institutions, with fitted values to smooth out differences for missing data.
5 Eironline (2012) ‘Radical changes in higher education’, 20th of July, URL: http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
6 Eurostat (2008 to 2011) ‘Financial aid to students as a percentage of total public
expenditure on education, at tertiary level’, last update 31st of July 2013 URL: http://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do.
7 One exception to this timeline concerns the publication data. We have used the most
recent sources from European Commission (2011a) and European Commission (2011b), for
which it seems that 2007 was the latest available data.
8 Some reforms may have since affected this situation.
9 OECD (2011) Education at a glance, Paris: OECD, Table B.1.4, p. 221, column 9
(All tertiary education including R&D activities) URL: http://www.oecd.org/education/
skills-beyond-school/48630868.pdf.
10 Predicted value using World Bank ‘Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP
per capita’, which was 25.1% for Greece at the latest available date in 2005, URL: http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TERT.PC.ZS?page=1.
11 The implementation of the 2008 law on the freedom and responsibilities of universities,
which provided universities with more autonomy in France, was just starting at the time this
data on autonomy was collected.
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13 The minimax technique normalizes indicators to have the same range [0,1] by
substracting the observation by the minimum value and dividing by the range of the
indicator values (OECD and European Commission (2008: 28).
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